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ARTICLE
RECONSTRUCTING REASONABLENESS IN
CRIMINAL LAW:
MODERATE JURY INSTRUCTIONS PROPOSAL
Hisham M Ramadan*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of reasonableness or "reasonable person" has become
one of the cornerstones in criminal law. It was introduced into the elements
of several offenses' and defenses.2 Some jurisdictions define it as an aver-
age, ordinary person who is a representative of the general community;3 oth-
ers are silent, and leave it to the jury to define as they desire.
This article proposes reconstructing the concept of reasonableness as
a rule of evidence as opposed to a rule of substance. Considering the "rea-
sonable person" concept as a permissive inference or a mandatory presump-
tion seems well-suited to the rules of evidence because its ability to accom-
plish the objectives and policies underlie the concept of reasonableness.
This article avoids the temptation of discussing the concept of reasonable-
ness within a particular offense or defense. Instead, this article isolates the
concept from the zone of particular defenses and offenses while discussing
the common foundation of the concept shared by every offense and defense.
* L.L.B. Ain Shams University (Cairo, Egypt), LL.M. Auckland University (Auckland, New Zealand),
LL.M. (Criminal Law) (New York State University at Buffalo), Fellow International Human Rights Law
Institute (DePaul University), S.J.D. Candidate and visiting lecturer at the university of Wisconsin school of
Law. Professor Walter J. Dickey's inspired me to write this article and offered his invaluable comments on
the early drafts. The author thanks professors Michael E. Smith and David Schultz for helpful comments on
the early drafts.
1. See Alabama criminal code, ALA. CODE. § 13A-2-2.3 (2001) (introducing the concept of reasonable-
ness into negligence); Delaware criminal code, DEL. CODE ANN. § 307 (2001) (introducing the concept of
reasonableness into intention, recklessness, knowledge or belief).
2. See Delaware criminal code, 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 431 (2001) (introducing the concept of reason-
ableness into self defense); Arizona criminal code, ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-404 (2001); Illinois criminal code,
§ 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(b) (2001) (introducing the concept of reasonableness into defense of provoca-
tion).
3. See Bedder v. DPP, I W.L.R. 1119 (1954). See also People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921-22 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992).
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Part II of this article traces the roots of the concept of reasonable-
ness, the factors that shaped it and its development by courts and legislators.
Part III explains the policies that underlie the reasonable person standard.
Part IV attributes the failure of achieving the goals of the reasonableness
standard to the current practice of considering reasonableness as a rule of
substance. Part V argues for an expansive view of construing reasonableness
as a rule of evidence that incorporates the genuine objectives of reasonable-
ness. Part VI clarifies the underpinnings of presumptions and inferences in
criminal law. It proposes constructing reasonableness as a presumption or an
inference, which is the best application of the rules of evidence to the con-
cept of reasonableness. Part VII concludes that the concept of reasonable-
ness should be construed as a rule of evidence. Part VIII of this article pro-
poses alternative jury instructions for the concept of reasonableness as a
mandatory presumption or as a permissive inference. It offers courts and
legislatures the choice of two alternative rules of evidence based upon the
weight of the burden that the defendant bears to overcome the evidential rule
of reasonableness. If reasonableness is construed as a mandatory presump-
tion, the defendant bears a greater burden than if reasonableness is construed
as a permissive inference. The proposal in this article is suitable for all of-
fenses and defenses in criminal law because of the generality of the discus-
sion.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF REASONABLENESS IN CRIMINAL LAW
One of the historical cornerstones in criminal liability is the maxim
"actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.', This maxim states that an individ-
ual cannot be convicted of a criminal offense unless he had a guilty mind
while committing the prohibited act. This cardinal rule is a purely subjective
test of liability that has dominated the legal analysis since the Bracton era5
and has-continued through the medieval period. For instance, Blackstone in
his analysis of provocation defense did not make any reference to objective
liability or its application of reasonableness. He considered the mere pulling
the deceased's nose or other acts of indignity as sufficient provocation.6 The
subjective liability approach emerges from the notion that individuals have
4. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 2 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94 (London, Macmillan
1883).
5. The issue of subjective mental state was the core of liability. See 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 340-42 (Harvard University Press 1986) (historically malice was clearly understood to
have subjective meaning involving an act wrongfully directed at the victim); Jeremy Horder, Two Histories
and Four Hidden Principals ofMens Rea, 113 L. Q. REV. 95 (1997).
6. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 190 (London, Strahan 13th
[Vol. 29:2
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the power to choose and should only be liable only for the misuse of his
power.7
By early nineteenth century, the language of reasonableness ap-
peared in East's writings on the provocation defense. However, the question
of reasonableness was only limited to the gravity of the provocation or to the
time elapsed between the provocative acts and the homicide. 8  By mid-
nineteenth century, some courts departed from the traditional subjective li-
ability standard by ignoring the actual mental state of the defendant. 9 The
test of a "reasonable and ordinary person" was implanted in the landmark
case of Welsh.l0 The standard of "reasonable and ordinary person" was men-
tioned only as a method of explaining the law of provocation to the jury."
Although this case utilized objective elements in assessing adequate provo-
cation, it was never intended to abrogate the subjective characteristics of the
defense or to imply a new standard of liability.12
Ultimately, three factors shaped the courts' decisions by the end of
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century: (1) historical subjec-
tive liability; (2) the emergence of objective liability; and (3) inadvertent
statements of the standard of reasonableness.
The courts struggled to formulate a satisfactory standard of reason-
ableness because of the three factors. Some courts adopted a purely objec-
tive standard of reasonableness 13 while others diluted its harshness by infus-
ing some subjective elements into "reasonable person" standard. 14  The
courts that adopted the hybrid, subjective/objective standard of reasonable-
ness were faced with the problem of choosing which subjective elements
7. Lord Simon concedes: "the general basis for criminal responsibility is the power of choice involved in
the axiomatic freedom of the human being." Lynch v. DPP, I All E.R. 913 (1975).
8. EDWARD HYDE EAST, I TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 232-55 (London, A. Strahan 1803)
9. See Regina v. Woodrow, 153 E.R. 907 (1846). See also Regina v. Stephens, I Q.B. 702 (1866).
10. Regina v. Welsh, II Cox CC 336 (1869).
11. Id. See also Lord Hoffmann in R v. Smith (Morgan), 4 All E.R. 289 (2000).
12. Although the "reasonable and prudent person" standard was introduced in 1869 in Welsh, Stephens
did not consider the rule established as rule in the common law of England in 1883. It was first proposed as
the standard of the ordinary person by Criminal Law Commission of 1878-1879. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN,
3 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 79-81(London, Macmillan 1883).
13. Bedder v. DPP, 1 W.L.R. 1119 (1954) (ignoring any unusual physical characteristics of the accused
for purposes of the "reasonable person" test). See also People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921-22 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (insisting that a defendant's belief is reasonable if and only if the hypothetical reasonable person
would have held a similar belief).
14. People v. Mathews, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming that a blind and hearing
-impaired defendant claiming self-defense was entitled to be held to the standard of reasonable blind and
hearing impaired person as opposed to that of a reasonable person with normal eyesight and hearing); Gentry
v. State, 441 S.E. 2d 249, 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that a reasonable person standard should be
measured against those of the reasonable woman); Rodriguez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) (upholding that the relative weight, size and strength of a defendant claiming self defense compared
with that of his victim are matters that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of the defendant
actions); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. App. 1977) (holding that a "reasonable person" does not
always mean "reasonable male," it should mean "reasonable woman" when the defendant is female).
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should be introduced into the reasonableness standard to be considered by
the jury. A subjective element of psychiatric evidence of a mental condition
of the defendant was accepted by some courts,1 5 while it was rejected by
others.1 6  The inconsistencies of the courts' decisions arose primarily from
competing theories of objective and subjective liability.
Reasonableness as a species of objective liability was designed to
eliminate the indeterminacy of subjective liability. It aimed to impose a rule
of law preventing defendants from escaping liability by setting their own
standard under the subjective liability label.17 These concerns were voiced
by the courts on many occasions. 18  Although these concerns have merit,
they are troubled by some practical considerations. The courts initially real-
ized, on the basis of fairness, that particular subjective traits of a defendant
distinguished him from the general community 19 ought to be considered by a
jury.2 ° Subsequently, some courts realized that they should recognize all the
particular characteristics of a defendant 2' so long as it is not mere un-
founded allegations of subjectiveness or futile excuses 22 because any distinc-
tion between the characteristics would be an arbitrary one. The view was
that to infuse into the objective test subjective factors such as immaturity, is
to recognize its effect on the defendant's decision making process. Why
15. R v Smith (Morgan), 4 All E.R. 289 (2000).
16. People v. Pecora, 246 N.E.2d 865 (Il1. App. Ct. 1969) (holding that the religious beliefs and the men-
tal disturbance of a defendant. irrelevant).
17. Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killing and the Appropriate Use of Battered Child
Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective Self-Defense and the Merits of Partial Excuses, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REv., 185, 208. Goldman argues that subjectivity of self defense would "infringe on the premise of
our criminal law system that the preservation of life is an important value and that the taking of a life will be
exempt from criminality and punishment only in a narrow, societal-determined set of circumstances." Id.
18. In Smith (Morgan), Lord Slynn concluded that "It is thus not enough for the accused to say "I am a
depressive; therefore I cannot be expected to exercise control." R v. Smith (Morgan), 4 All E.R. 289 (2000).
The jury must ask whether he has exercised the degree of self-control to be expected of someone in his situa-
tion." Id. See also People v. Goetz:
We cannot allow the perpetrator of serious crime to go free simply because that person
believed his action were reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm. To
completely exonerate . . . an individual, no matter how aberrational or bizarre his
thought patterns, would allow citizens to set their own standards for the permissible use
of force. It would also allow a legally competent defendant suffering from delusions to
kill or perform act of violence with impunity, contrary to fundamental principles of jus-
tices and criminal law.
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E. 2d41, 50 (N.Y. 1986).
19. R v. Dincer, [VR 460 (1983).
20. DPP v. Camplin, 2 All E.R. 168 (1978) (allowing age of the defendant to be factor); State v. Kelly,
478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984) (accepting history of abuse in cases of battered women syndromes in the jury in-
structions); State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985) (holding that the reasonable person in the case of
a battered woman defense is the "reasonabl[y] prudent battered wife").
21. Lord Morris in DPP v. Camplin, stated, "[ilt would now be unreal to tell the jury that the notional
'reasonable man' is someone without the characteristics of the accused: it would be to intrude into their prov-
ince." 2 All E.R. 168 (1978).
22. RICHARD SINGER & JOHN LA FOND, CRIMINAL LAW 53 (Aspen 1997).
23. See Lord Slynn's analysis in R v. Smith (Morgan), 4 All E.R. 289 (2000).
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should a court not recognize that other factors, such as serious clinical de-
pression, affect a defendant's decision making process?
24
Courts that resisted accepting personal characteristics were moti-
vated by a fear that introducing every subjective unique characteristic of the
defendant to the reasonableness standard would eventually destroy the objec-
tivity of the standard.25 Most importantly, this would frustrate the function
of objectivity, which protects society from unjustifiable, unexpected behav-
ior. Furthermore, the standard of reasonableness must "possess some gener-
ality; a standard hewn to the unique attributes of each person would be no
standard. ,,26
Those who introduce only selective subjective elements into the rea-
sonable person standard lack criteria for the selection. Indisputably, some
subjective traits such as bad temper, envy or greed should not be considered
by the jury. However, for practical considerations, a list of acceptable and
non-acceptable subjective traits is not available. The jury can perform this
function efficiently, by striking the balance between acceptable and non-
acceptable subjective elements, as representative of the social moral norms.
However, the implication of an "open door policy" for the subjective ele-
ments or personal characteristics of the defendant would destroy the founda-
tion of reasonableness by eliminating the objectivity of the standard.
III. POLICIES THAT UNDERLIE THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
Numerous objectives promote the reasonableness standard. A purely
objective form of reasonableness proposes that public policy sacrifice indi-
vidual for the general good.27 The punishment should not depend on the
moral blameworthiness of the defendant.28 The tests of liability are external.
A defendant will be held to a reasonably prudent person standard even
though he may be morally innocent because he has less than ordinary intelli-
gence or prudence.29 Individuals are a means to an end in that criminal law
24. Id.
25. Robert Unikel, Comment, "'Reasonable" Doubt: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 326, 371 (1992).
26. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 507 (1978).
27. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (Little, Brown & Co. 1963).
28. Id. at 49. For a similar analysis, see Paul H Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as
Prerequisite to Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Stasko, 370
A.2d 350 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (noting the psychologist was introduced to testify concerning the appellant's
tendency to have a short temper and erupt in sudden rages. The purpose of the testimony was to show that, in
the case of this particular accused, there was sufficient provocation for the attack. This evidence was inadmis-
sible since the court insisted that reasonableness is purely an objective standard.).
29. Id. at 5 1. See also Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 777 (Mass. 1897) (stating "the aim of
the law is not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain external results") (Holmes, J.).
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uses them to promote the general welfare by setting an example for others of
the appropriate modes of conduct.3°
A moderate prospective suggests that one of the prime rationales for
the reasonableness standard is to protect individuals from unjustified threats
and to expose them to what they may expect from their fellow citizen.31
Therefore, reasonableness is measured by the relationship between the vic-
tim and the defendant.32 The extraordinary characteristics of the defendant
shall be considered only if it was known or obvious to the victim.
33
It has been argued that reasonableness represents the socially accept-
able standard of conduct. 34 Reasonableness crystallizes the norms and val-
ues of the society and incorporates them into a set of rules that govern indi-
viduals' conduct and communicates its meanings to the public frankly. 35
Conduct is deemed acceptable when it meets our social expectations. We
expect individuals to control negative feelings of anger, jealousy, and
greed.36 If an individual fails to control such feelings there is no reason to
award him deferential treatment or excuse his conduct.37 By contrast, when
conduct is understandable and expected from a person in the defendant's
situation because of a particular trait or an infirmity in human nature, such a
person may be excused.38
In sum, the objectives of the standard of reasonableness are: (1) pro-
tecting individuals from unjustified conducts by exposing them only to ex-
pected behavior; (2) setting a standard of conduct manifesting the social
moral norms; and (3) educating the public of the proper and acceptable stan-
dard of behavior. The logical inquiry following this exposition of the objec-
tives is: has the reasonableness standard achieved these objectives?
30. See FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 505-07.
31. Lord Diplock, DPP v. Camplin, 2 All E.R. 168 (1978) (defining reasonable person to mean "an ordi-
nary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed of such powers of self-
control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens will exercise in society as it is today.").
32. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 195 (Cambridge University Press
1999).
33. Id.
34. Martha Minow & Todd Rakoff, Is the "Reasonable Person " a Reasonable Standard in a Multicul-
tural World?, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 48 (Austin Sarat, Marianne Constable, David
Engel, Valerie Hans & Susan Lawrence, eds.) (1998).
35. Id.
36. FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 514.
37. Id.
38. See R v. Humphreys, 4 All E.R. 1008 (1995).
[Vol. 29:2
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IV. HAVE WE ACHIEVED THE OBJECTIVES OF A REASONABLENESS
STANDARD?
The first objective of reasonableness is setting a standard of conduct
manifesting the social moral norms. This objective is per se false because
the standard of reasonableness ignores the uniqueness of an individual's be-
havior.39 When the standard is strictly applied, it prevents the consideration
of relevant circumstances particular to an individual case.4° It has been said
that "[an attempt to generalize rule of conduct results in] losing variability,
individuality, and meaning, and ending up with deceptively low correlations
that relate more to mythical exemplar than any particular person. ''4' By es-
tablishing an "average person" as our standard, we actually end up describ-
ing no person at all.
Reasonableness is a misleading concept because it describes both ac-
ceptable and non-acceptable behavior.42 In reality, it is a flawed concept that
opens the door for both judges and jury "to import their own values-or their
assessment of society's values-into the definition of what is or is not rea-
sonable., 43  To make matters worse, reasonableness indirectly invites the
jury to nullify the law by justifying the defendant's behavior when they be-
lieve that any reasonable person (including perhaps themselves) "would have
acted similarly under the circumstances. '"44
The reasonable person standard stands as a barrier that precludes
consideration of the unique characteristics of an individual defendant. For
instance, if a defendant is from a minority group, his cultural background
will be ignored because the "reasonable person" standard reflects only the
norms of the dominant culture and exclude the values of the other groups in
society. 45 The problem materializes when a defendant from a different cul-
39. Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspec-
tive on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 462-67 (1981).
40. Id.
41. Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the
Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. REV. 742, 767 (1995).
42. See Robert Unikel, Comment, "Reasonable" Doubt: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard
in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 326, 329 (1992) ("The concept of 'reasonableness' effectively
establishes the boundary between an acceptable exercise of individual freedom and an unacceptable inference
with the rights of the others.").
43. John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27
(1997). See also IRWIN A. HOROWITZ & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW 73 (1984)
("Judges project rules of reason into their decisions by referring to the actions of a hypothetical 'reasonable
person'....").
44. Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 66 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1207, 1209 (2001).
45. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 818 (1992). See
also William I. Torry, The Doctrine of Provocation and the Reasonable Person Test: An Essay on Culture
2003]
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ture is denied the opportunity to explain why his actions were reasonable
under the traditions of his culture.
The second objective of reasonableness is that the objectivity of the
reasonable person standard manifests the cumulative moral sense of the
community. It educates individuals of the proper and acceptable standard of
conduct within the community. Indeed, law can be educative by communi-
cating to the public the proper standard of conduct. Petrazycki offers an
excellent analysis of the educational function of law.46 He explains that the
law influences public behavior through the process of habit-formation.47 In
this context, the acts required by the law influence the individuals who per-
form them. 48 The repetition of these acts promote positive habits of doing
and negative habits of abstaining.49 Habits develop individual characters by
endorsing positive good habits and weakening negative bad habits. 50 It cre-
ates an impulsive propensity in society to exercise beneficial habits and to
refrain from harmful habits.5 '
The natural and logical question following acknowledgement of the
educational function of law is whether implanting a reasonable person stan-
dard educates individuals. Consider this hypothetical: Conduct X, Y, and Z
is prohibited. Individual A is punished for conduct X. Individual B is pun-
ished for conduct Y. Can both A and B's punishment be used to educate
individuals C, D, and E? What if the conducts X, Y and Z are vague con-
cepts? If so, then punishing A and B will educate no one. In fact, it will
have a negative effect. It will demoralize society because it would be pun-
ishing individuals for conduct they did not know was wrong or at least were
not able to fully comprehend the impropriety or illegality of it. Reasonable-
ness is not a specific act; it is an elastic concept containing an unlimited
number of prohibitions. In straightforward terms, it is a vague criteria rather
than a simple act. The educational function of law works efficiently with
particular conducts such as homicide or larceny. Therefore, the message that
is carried to the public for punishing the murderer is that killing is prohib-
ited. Similarly, we punish for larceny because theft is prohibited. The situa-
tion is different with the reasonableness standard. We demand individuals to
act reasonably. However, there is neither a rational definition of what con-
Theory and the Criminal Law, 29 INT'L J. Soc. L. 1, 5-6 (2001).
46. LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 301 (Hugh W. Babb trans., 1955).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
(Vol. 29:2
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stitutes reasonable conduct, nor do the courts agree on what acts are consid-
ered reasonable. 51
Professor H.L.A. Hart rightly concluded that punishing innocent in-
dividuals to advance certain social objectives would generate adverse ef-
fects.52 It would produce a "state of general alarm and terror ... if it were
known that the innocent were likely to be seized and subjected to the pains
of punishment [and might be] worse than any advance in security of social
welfare brought about by these means could outweigh.,
53
The third objective of the reasonableness standard is the claim that
the standard protects individuals from unjustified conduct by exposing them
only to expected behavior.54 Empirical research in the field of psychology
refutes this claim. One study shows that the jury does not need the standard
of objective liability/reasonableness to reach the correct decision.55 Despite
the lack of guidance in the purely subjective liability formula, jurors "get it
right by their common sense when there is some substance to the story of the
defendant., 56 These results are best understood by another empirical study
that suggests that society's calculus of liability is subjective, complex, and
weightier than the law. Its outcome shows gradations rather than dichoto-
mies. 5
7
Furthermore, there is no data to support the claim of the protective
function of reasonableness. The jurists who pursue this claim mistakenly
assume that reasonableness or the conduct of a "reasonable person" is
known. Rather, they are elastic concepts implanted to address a factual in-
quiry. If the concept of reasonableness is coherently understood by all indi-
viduals, this claim will stand. But no court has tried or given a definition of
reasonableness. 58 In other words, this objective is a valid and comprehensi-
ble one, but the means of achieving it is unconvincing because reasonable-
ness is a legal fiction designed to assess the appropriateness of a conduct in a
particular set of circumstances.
51. Compare R v. Smith, 4 All E.R. 289 (2000) (holding mental condition was included in the reason-
ableness standard) with People v. Pecora, 246 N.E.2d 865 (1969) (holding mental condition excluded from
reasonableness standard).
52. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 76 (1968).
53. Id.
54. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 242 (3d ed.1999).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, When Mistakes Happen: Commonsense Rules of Culpa-
bility, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'YL. 65, 118 (1997).
58. See Regina v. McCarthy, 2 All E.R. 262, 265 (1954) (Lord Goddard, C.J.) ("No court has ever given,
nor do we think ever can give, a definition of what constitutes a reasonable or average man. That must be left
to the collective good sense of the jury, and what, no doubt, would govern their opinion would be the nature of
the retaliation used by the provoked person.").
2003]
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While the objective of setting a standard of conduct manifesting the
social moral norms is false, the other objectives of educating the public and
protecting individuals from unjustified, unexpected behavior are sound and
legitimate. However, the reasonableness standard does not advance these
objectives.
V. RULES OF SUBSTANCE VERSUS RULES OF EVIDENCE
A recent English court decision concluded that reasonableness or the
"reasonable person" standard was originally created only to explain the law
to the jury. 59 This conclusion undermines the importance of the reasonable-
ness standard and inspires us to investigate what type of legal rule is needed
in criminal trials as a substitute for the reasonableness standard, which failed
to achieve its objectives.
As a primary issue, we may realize that reasonableness as a rule of
substance fails to provide a comprehensible test of liability. For instance, in
the Model Penal Code, the defense of duress is available under circum-
stances in "which a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to
resist. ' '60 In other words, the defense is unavailable when it is reasonable to
expect the defendant not to have committed the crime. The issue of assess-
ing sufficient control over a state of affairs is very difficult to capture in a
simple rule of substance.6 '
Furthermore, a single rule of substance (i.e. test of reasonableness)
does not reflect our social expectations. In terms of the reasonableness re-
quirement in the mistake defense, the background emotions of the rapist
(lustful, self-seeking), the defender of another (hot-headed), and the police
officer (calm and restrained) should lead to different cognitive tests.62
Where emotions are bad, we should expect higher standards of reasonable-
ness, but where they are good, the test of reasonableness requires their aug-
mentation by the moral judgment of society.6 3
59. See R v. Smith (Morgan), I AC 146, 172 (2000) (Lord Hoffman, C.J.) ("[T]he concept of the "reason-
able man" has never been more than a way of explaining the law to a jury; an anthropomorphic image to
convey to them, with a suitable degree of vividness, the legal principle that even under provocation, people
must conform to an objective standard of behavior which society is entitled to expect."). See also, Regina v.
Dryden, 4 All E.R. 987, 997 (1995) (Lord Taylor) ("The purpose of taking the reasonable man was to have a
yardstick to measure the loss of self-control that will be permitted to found a defense of provocation.").
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1).
61. See Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 80-81 (Antony Duff ed. 1998).
62. See Jeremy Horder, Cognation, Emotion and Criminal Culpability, 106 L. Q. REV. 469, 469-86
(1990).
63. Id.
[Vol. 29:2
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What we need is a flexible rule that incorporates the two objectives
of the reasonableness standard: educating the public and protecting individu-
als from unjustified, unexpected behavior); and considering the defendant's
actual state of mind. Reasonableness does not consider the defendant's ac-
tual state of mind. In fact, adopting reasonableness in its purely objective
form or in its hybrid subjective/objective form would change the decision
matrix from resolving questions of fact to resolving questions of law. In-
stead of exploring the defendant's actual intent and thereby designing a rule
to deal with the individual's behavior in modern society, the objectivity of
reasonableness offers a magical device that transforms the questions of facts
to questions of law by implanting a median standard of reasonableness which
reflects the desired standard of conduct. The defendant's liability is not de-
termined according to intent but rather by the social appropriateness of a
conduct.64
Ignoring the defendant's state of mind raises some fairness consid-
erations. There is a substantial fear that many innocent defendants who fall
below the standard of reasonableness are unfairly convicted. The courts
show no consideration to the defendant's state of mind when resolving the
question of reasonableness.65 Consider R. v. Ward.66 The defendant, a man
of "sub-normal" intelligence, was charged with the murder of a small child.
The defendant testified that when the child was crying he picked her up and
shook her until she stopped. Forensic evidence showed that the child died as
a result of the defendant's shaking. However, the defendant did not under-
stand that he was harming her. Neither the defendant's actual mental state
nor his partial mental disability was considered in the jury instructions.67
64. In discussing the provocation defense, Professor Richard Singer realized the effect of ignoring the
actual mental state of the accused through creating inflexible rules of law. He observed:
A system which precludes evidence of words which actually enraged the defendant to
the point of loss of self-control, which precludes evidence of his victim's adultery
unless the defendant saw the physical act itself. . . and which views the question of
cooling off as one of law rather than of fact has, for all practical purposes, relegated the
defendant to the sidelines. The issue of his culpability has, thus, been transformed into
one measured by rules, rather than by his actual mental state.
Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I -Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and The Model Penal
Code, 27 B.C. L. REv. 243,280 (1986).
65. See State v. McAllister, 196 A.2d 786, 792 (N.J. 1964) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The case
asserted that:
The provocation which at common law reduces a homicide to manslaughter must be
such as is calculated to produce hot blood or passion in a reasonable man, an average
man of ordinary self-control. Unless it meets this objective standard of reasonableness,
the subjective fact of passion does not make the killing manslaughter. Such factors as
mental abnormality or intoxication are therefore irrelevant, since the 'reasonable man'
standard postulates a sane and sober man.
Id.
66. Regina v. Ward, I All E.R. 565 (1956).
67. The trial judge's instruction read, "If, when he did the act which he did do, he must as a reasonable
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Consequently the defendant was convicted of murder. This question arose:
does convicting the defendant of murder serve the objectives of reasonable-
ness? The conviction will demoralize society since the underlying message
of such a conviction is that we punish individuals for their stupidity rather
than the wrongfulness of their conduct. 68 Punishing the "sub-normal" intel-
ligence of a defendant will not protect society from future conduct which is a
product of mental disability. 69 Moreover, apart from strict liability offenses,
the punishment is warranted only if there is a fault element in the crime.7°
Obviously, fault is lacking because the defendant's conduct was a product of
his mental disability. Therefore, the punishment is unwarranted.
One possible solution to avoid the problem of unfairness is to adopt a
purely subjective standard of liability. However, this solution does not serve
the objectives of reasonableness and the standard for judgment would col-
lapse into the personal characteristics of the defendants.7' It would open the
door for lawlessness and disorder by accepting futile allegations of the de-
fendant's special traits. This is the dilemma that was created by adopting a
rule of substance to resolve factual questions. By contrast an evidentiary
rule may offer the flexibility needed for balancing fairness considerations to
a particular defendant and the social policy necessitated by modern society.
The jury as a representative of the social moral conscience will be able to
strike this balance after being informed of our social policy (i.e. the objec-
tives of reasonableness) and the very personal characteristics of a defendant.
However, it is also fair to tell the jury that society assumes that a law-
abiding citizen will meet the social expectations under particular circum-
stances. For instance, we assume that mere insulting words do not justify
killing. Nor do we assume that negative feelings of envy, jealously, or greed
are sufficient provocation to mitigate homicide. These assumptions are very
similar to the legal presumption of sanity. These assumptions were not cre-
man have contemplated that death or grievous bodily harm was likely to result to the child as a result of what
he did, then, members of the jury, if you are satisfied about that, he is guilty of murder." Regina v. Ward, I
Q.B. 351, 352 (1956).
68. Professor Glanville Williams, in response to Morgan's decision in DPP v. Morgan, stated: "To con-
vict the stupid man [in reference to the unreasonable man] would be to convict him for what lawyers call
inadvertent negligence-the honest conduct which may be the best that man can do but that does not come up
to the so-called reasonable man." Letter from Glanville Williams, to Times of London (May 8, 1975), re-
printed in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 323 (6th ed.
1994).
69. The punishment is inefficacious where "the penal provision, thought it was conveyed to the individual
notice, could produce no effect with respect to preventing his engaging in the fact prohibited: as in case of
extreme infancy, insanity and intoxication." JEREMY BENTHm, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 24 (1830).
70. A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith, Criminalization and the Role of Theory, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 6
(A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds. 1996) ("Criminalization of harms cannot be accounted for without refer-
ence to fault .... "). See also HART, supra note 52 (1968) ("[l]t is morally permissible to punish only volun-
tary commission of a moral wrong.").
71. FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 513.
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ated by legislative bodies; rather, they were embodied in the natural course
of actions.72
Giving weight to these facts and to numerous court decisions sug-
gesting that reasonableness was invented to reflect the social expectation of
a conduct 73 or the "social assumptions," the wished-for rule of evidence is
self-suggested. It must fall into a recognized legal category of presumptions
or inferences. This is a matter that requires further examination.
VI. PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES IN CRIMINAL LAW AS VERIFICATION
TO THE "REASONABLE PERSON" RULE
There are several alternative theoretical backgrounds for presump-
tions and inferences in criminal law. Two dominant theories offer persua-
sive explanations of the reasonable person rule as a presumption or permis-
sive inference. The probabilities theory suggests that a presumption can be
created upon logical probability. 74 When the existence of a fact is over-
whelmingly probable, then a presumption is fashioned. For example, the
presumption of sanity is based upon logical probability that the vast majority
of individuals are sane. 75 A defendant claiming otherwise may bear the bur-
den of proving his non-conformity with the general rule. Similarly, society
expects law-abiding citizens to act or react in a "certain manner." Mere in-
sulting words do not justify or mitigate killing. Similarly, raising self-
defense status does not justify use of excessive force. There is always a so-
cial expectation that individuals behave in a "certain manner." This "certain
manner" is present in the conduct of the reasonable person proper, who ex-
hibits expected and acceptable conduct.
Alternatively, public policy theory suggests that presumption can be
created to implement public policy. Obviously, the essence of the "reason-
able and ordinary person" rule reflects the legitimate social guidelines. Fur-
thermore, a public policy suggests that individuals' behavior ought to meet
social expectation of conduct.
72. See State v. Grilz, 666 P.2d 1059 (Ariz. 1983) (upholding the conclusion that presumption of sanity is
common law presumption as opposed to statutory presumption).
73. See Lord Diplock in DPP v. Camplin, 2 All E.R. 168 (1978). See also Lord Slynn in R v. Smith
(Morgan), 4 All E.R. 289 (2000).
74. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 307 (7th ed. 1993).
75. Thompson v. Dixon, 987 F. 2d 1038, 1041 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding instructions asserting "[S]anity
or soundness of mind is the natural condition of people, therefore every one is presumed sane until the con-
trary is made to appear"). See also United States v. Hendrix, 542 F. 2d 879, 881 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasizing
that "[J]ustification for the 'lingering inference' of sanity is found in the common experience that most men
are sane"); People v. Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475, 481 (1974) (concluding that the presumption of sanity is "being
the normal and usual condition of the man kind").
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Remarkably, the relationship between reasonableness and inferences
or presumptions was recognized by courts and legislative bodies alike. In
some cases, reasonableness gives rise to the inference of fact,7 6 while in oth-
ers, the legislature presumes that individuals act reasonably, and therefore,
require the prosecution to overcome such presumptions.77
The second phase of analysis investigates the best category of pre-
sumptions that is consistent with constitutional rules of presumptions and
inferences as expounded by the United States Supreme Court and employs
the "reasonable person" rule objectives explained above.
The common law recognizes three classes of presump-
tions/inferences:
1. Praesumptiones juris et de jure. These types of presumptions are
inferences of facts that cannot be challenged by producing contradictory evi-
dence. 78 They are rules of substance disguised in the form of legal infer-
ences. 79  These sorts of presumptions do not differ significantly from the
"reasonable person" rule as presently applied in that the defendant cannot
offer evidence disproving his conformity to the hypothetical standard of the
conduct of a reasonable person. The United States Supreme Court reintro-
duced it in Sandstrom v. Montana,80 concluding that this type of conclusive
presumption is simply a rule of law. It is irrebuttable and requires the trier
of fact to definitively find the presumed fact once the basic facts are estab-
lished. Therefore, adopting this type of presumption may change only the
label of a legal doctrine without affecting its essence or consequences.
2. Praesumptiones juris sed non de jure. These types of presump-
tions are inferences of facts that can be challenged by contradictory evi-
dence.81 In essence, they offer merely prima facie proof of the fact pre-
sumed that is rebuttable by contradictory evidence or by a stronger presump-
tion which suggests contrary evidence. 82 This type is modernly termed a
76. See, e.g., State v. Johnson 829 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Wash. 1992) (stating "[I]f a person has information
which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which are described by
law as being a crime, the jury is permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge.");
United States v. Gallo, 543 F. 2d 361, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that the comparison to the ordinary
person has been imported into many legal definitions of knowledge to make it clear to the jury what level of
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for it to conclude that the defendant had actual knowledge.); State v. Ship,
610 P.2d 1322 (Wash. 1980) (elaborating that the comparison to the ordinary person creates only an inference;
the jury must still find subjective knowledge.).
77. A.R.S. § 13-411 (2001) (C). A person is presumed to be acting reasonably for the purposes of this
section if he is acting to prevent the commission of any of the offenses listed in subsection A of this section.
78. J. W. CECIL TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 455 (19th ed. 1966).
79. Id.
80. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
81. KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 78, at 445-46.
82. Id.
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"mandatory presumption. ' 8 3  It is divided into two types. The first type
merely shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. 84 Once the defendant
meets his burden, the ultimate burden of proof is on the state. The second
type of mandatory presumption entirely shifts the burden of proof to the de-
fendant. Reasonableness as a presumption can be considered the logical
parallel to the presumption of sanity. They are both based upon the statisti-
cal concept that most people are sane and will do as the reasonable person
does. An individual failing to conform to the accepted social rule might bear
the burden of proving his exceptionality. The rules of the presumption of
sanity can be imported into the presumption of reasonableness. Under the
presumption of sanity, the State places the burden of production, or a low
burden of persuasion, on the defendant to prove his insanity. 85 Once the de-
fendant meets his burden, the presumption of sanity vanishes and the State
bears the burden of proof of the defendant's sanity beyond reasonable
doubt. 86  Similarly, under the proposed presumption of reasonableness, the
defendant bears the burden of production or a low burden of persuasion to
prove his special traits (i.e. subnormal intelligence), which justifies non-
conformity with general norms of conducts. Once the defendant satisfies the
burden, the burden of proof is transferred to the State to show that the defen-
dant's special trait either does not exist or does not justify non-conformity
with general norms. Proving the defendant's justificatory special trait in-
volves a two stage procedures: (1) proving the existence of the special trait;
and (2) assessing its affect on the defendant's non-conformity with the gen-
eral norms of conduct. Such an assessment is a factual inquiry that falls en-
tirely in the jury's domain. Logically, the guidelines of the assessment are
the objectives of reasonableness and the defendant's actual state of mind. In
83. CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 490 (John William Strong et al eds.,
West 4th ed. 1992). See also County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
84. Allen, 442 U.S. at 160.
85. There are a number of variations regarding the burden of the defendant; in some jurisdictions insanity
is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by the preponderance of evidence. See, e.g., L.S.A-
C.C.P. art 652; State v. Scott, 21 So. 271 (La. 1897); State v. Willie, 360 So.2d 813 (La. 1978); State v. Wat-
kins, 340 So.2d 235 (La. 1976); State v. Lee, 395 So. 2d 700 (1981) (declining to consider the statute uncon-
stitutional relying on Patterson v. New York 432 U.S. 197 (1977)). See also, Grammer v. State 196 So. 268
(Ala. 1940) (holding that insanity is an affirmative defense which must be proven by the defendant to the
reasonable satisfaction of the jury). Some courts require "some evidence" to be introduced which weakens the
presumption of sanity. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486-87 (1895); Hall v. United States,
295 F.2d 26, 27-28 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Marable, 657 F.2d 75, 76 (4th Cir. 1981); State v. Francis,
576 P.2d 682, 684 (Kan. 1978). Other courts require the defendant to introduce "evidence sufficient to present
a reasonable doubt of sanity." See, e.g., Yohn v. State, 476 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1985); Crockham v. State, 723
So.2d 355, 356 (Fla. 1998); Young v. State, 280 N.E.2d 595, 598 (1972) (requiring the defendant in a criminal
case to present "competent or admissible evidence" on the issue of his or her sanity).
86. Yohn, 476 So.2d at 126 (Once the accused introduces evidence sufficient to present a reasonable doubt
of sanity, the presumption of sanity vanishes and the accused's sanity must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.).
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this context, we advise the jury that the law presumes that the defendant
should have conformed to the general norms of conduct (i.e., acting reasona-
bly in the circumstances as an ordinary person possessing the natural charac-
teristics of the defendant). The jury may reach this factual determination by
balancing the State's interest (manifested in advancing the objectives of the
presumption of reasonableness as protecting individuals from unjustified,
unexpected behavior) and the defendant's interests of considering his actual
state of mind.
It should be noted that incorporating rules of the presumption of san-
ity into the reasonableness doctrine would likely be held constitutional given
that the presumption of sanity's constitutionality is regularly approved by
federal and state courts alike.87 Mandatory presumptions may violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the State
from using evidential presumptions in jury instructions that have the effect
of relieving the state of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for
every essential element of the crime. 88 Therefore, the "reasonable person"
rule cannot be formulated as a mandatory presumption if, and only if, pre-
suming that the defendant should have acted in a particular manner, con-
forming to the "reasonable person" model would relieve the state of its bur-
den of proving the elements of the offense.89
3. Praesumptiones hominis (or praesumptiones facti). These are
inferences of facts which the law permits but does not compel the jury to
draw.90 The law does not allocate the burden of proof to the defendant with
respect to the inferred facts. 9 l The United States Supreme Court termed this
category "permissive presumption." 92 However, such terminology will only
87. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (State may impose burden of proving insanity on the
defendant); Median v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (explaining that a state may establish a presumption
that defendant is competent to stand trail and make him shoulder the burden of overcoming the presumption);
Stanly v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1979). Stanly held:
[W]here the jury was instructed that state had burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt
every element of a crime, no constitutional violation occurred by placing burden of
proof on defendant to prove his sanity, despite contention that element of malice afore-
thought in murder charge was so inextricably intertwined with presumption of sanity
that to require defendant to prove his insanity required him to disprove an essential ele-
ment of the offense.
Id.
88. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
89. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 510 (invalidating
instruction stating "the law presumes that a person intended the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts");
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
90. KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 78, at 456.
91. MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, supra note 83, at 489. See also Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 (citing Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837 at 840 (1973)) (explaining that a "permissive presumption" allows, but does not
require, the fact finder to infer the "element fact" from proof of the basic fact, and places no burden of any
kind on the defendant).
92. See Allen, 442 U.S. 140.
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cause jury confusion 93 since presumptions compel the factfinder to draw a
conclusion based upon proof of certain underlying facts.94 On the other
hand, inferences do not command the factfinder to reach a particular conclu-
sion. The factfinder is free to reject or credit the inference upon the compel-
ling nature of the facts which underlie the inference. 95 A number of lower
court decisions demonstrate that advising the jury that it "may infer" the
suggested conclusion from basic facts is the preferable formula.96 Therefore,
for the purpose of clarity, this category is better termed permissive infer-
ences.
Inferences are subject to the rationality requirement of the Due Proc-
ess Clause which requires that the fact to be inferred must "more likely than
not" give weight to the facts that underlie the inference. 97 Obviously the use
of permissive inferences passes the rationality requirement test because the
"reasonable person" hypothetically symbolizes an average, ordinary person.
Such a hypothetical person is not more than a representative of the general
community's acceptable standard of behavior. The "reasonable person" be-
haves as the vast majority of individuals.98 Therefore, the conduct of the
"reasonable person" is "more probable than not" since the vast majority of
individuals behave like him.
By implementing permissive instructions, we advise the jury to con-
sider the implication of the circumstantial evidence and ensure they may
draw conclusions from such evidence. 99  Thus, adopting permissive infer-
ence analysis as an explanation for the "reasonable person" serves the objec-
tives of the "reasonable person" rule. We enforce the public policy of pro-
tecting individuals from unjustified, unexpected behavior by making an in-
ference that the defendant should have acted in a particular manner conform-
93. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 83, at 450-51.
94. Id.
95. Shari L. Jacobson, Special Topics in the Law of Evidence: Mandatory and Permissive Presumption in
Criminal Cases: The Morass Created by Allen, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1009, 1010.
96. United States v. Graham, 858 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1988) (approving instruction that jury "may
draw the inference" that defendant "intended all the consequences which one standing in like circumstances
and possessing like knowledge" would expect.); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1984)
(upholding instruction that "[i]t is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable
consequences of acts .... "); United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1092 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding
instruction that "[y]ou may consider it reasonable to draw the inference and find that a person intends the
natural and the probable consequences of acts knowingly done.").
97. Allen, 442 U.S. at 165-67. See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36-37 (1969) (presuming that
a person possessing marijuana knows it is imported is irrational and arbitrary); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463, 467 (1943) (invalidating presumption that possession of firearm was presumptive evidence that the
weapon was received in interstate commerce). See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 83, at
490.
98. Masciantonio v. R (1995) 183 CLR 58. See also Paul H Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal
Harm as Prerequisite to Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975).
99. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND
PRACTICE 236 (1995).
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ing to the behavior of an average person who possesses the personal charac-
teristics of the defendant (i.e. age, intelligence level, gender, culture, and
ethnic background). We educate the jury regarding public policy by pro-
nouncing the societal values and policy considerations underlying the infer-
ence. Moreover, we advise the jury to consider the defendant's actual state
of mind. By doing so, we ensure paramount consideration of the objectives
of the "reasonable person" rule, but we also give the innocent defendant a
window of opportunity to rebut the inference by evidence examined at trial.
Any unusual characteristics of the defendant may be presented and proved.
In this context, the jury strikes a balance between public policy considera-
tions and fairness considerations in considering the defendant's actual state
of mind.
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of reasonableness is not in and of itself a bad one, but
framing it as rule of substance diverts our attention from the true nature of
reasonableness as a factual inquiry, which should be assessed by evidentiary
rules, as opposed to a rule of substance which was troubled by the circular
competing considerations of objective and subjective liability. Reasonable-
ness as a rule of substance fails to achieve its objectives and ignores the de-
fendant's state of mind. By contrast, reasonableness as a rule of evidence
can advance the stated objectives and gives consideration to the defendant's
actual state of mind.
Reasonableness as a rule of evidence is best framed as a mandatory
presumption or permissive inference. It depends on evaluating the priorities
at stake. Those priorities are the State's interests in protecting individuals
from unjustified, unexpected behavior, and the defendant's interests, in con-
sidering his actual state of mind. Legislative bodies and courts may adopt
either evidentiary rule. In the selection process, the courts and the legisla-
tures must give careful consideration to the most distinguishing feature of
inferences that they remain in the case despite the presentation of contrary
proof. Unlike presumptions that do not survive, the production of competent
evidence may tend to prove the contrary of the presumed fact.1°° Features
that express reasonableness as inferences give the jury broad power in as-
sessing the reasonableness of a conduct. In contrast, reasonableness as a
presumption restricts jury assessment by placing the burden of proof on the
defendant or distributing it between the defendant and the State. So long as
criminal law is a major concern, it is preferable to adopt the permissive in-
100. Thompson v. State 646 N.E. 2d 687 (1995).
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ference rule because the risk of erroneous conviction greatly outweighs the
State's interest.
VIII. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Reasonableness as Permissive Inference
Ladies and Gentlemen:
You have heard the reasonableness or "reasonable person/reasonable
man" requirement. This requirement allows you to infer that the defendant
should have acted as an average, ordinary person would. Specifically, as one
who possesses the defendant's particular characteristics such as age, gender,
intelligence level, educational and culture background and any other charac-
teristics that distinguish the defendant from the general community. How-
ever, you should know that you are at large to draw or ignore the inference.
This requirement was designed to protect individuals from unjustified, unex-
pected risks. The defendant has the right to rebut this inference through the
introduction of evidence. If you believe that there is sufficient evidence to
rebut the inference, do not hold the defendant accountable as a reasonable
person. If the inference is rebutted by sufficient evidence, you must hold the
defendant liable according to what he or she actually believed.
B. Reasonableness as Mandatory Presumption
1. Type One: merely shifts the burden of production to the defendant
Ladies and Gentlemen:
You have heard the reasonableness or "reasonable person/reasonable
man" requirement. This requirement presumes that the defendant should
have acted as an average, ordinary person would. Specifically, as one who
possesses the defendant's particular characteristics such as age, gender, in-
telligence level, educational and culture background and any other character-
istics that distinguish the defendant from the general community. This re-
quirement was designed to protect individuals from unjustified, unexpected
risks. In your assessment as to the reasonableness of the defendant's con-
duct, you must consider the defendant's actual state of mind. You must hold
the defendant accountable as a reasonable person, unless the defendant offers
satisfactory evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption. Once the defen-
dant offers such evidence, the State must disprove the evidence presented by
the defendant (either beyond reasonable doubt if reasonableness is integrated
into the elements of the offense, otherwise to the satisfaction of the jury). If
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the State fails to disprove the defendant's evidence, you must hold the de-
fendant accountable according to what he actually believed.
2. Type Two: shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant
Ladies and Gentlemen:
You have heard the reasonableness or "reasonable person/reasonable
man" requirement. This requirement presumes that the defendant should
have acted as an average, ordinary person would. Specifically, as one who
possesses the defendant's characteristics such as age, gender, intelligence
level, educational and culture background, and any other characteristics that
distinguish the defendant from the general community. This requirement
was designed to protect individuals from unjustified, unexpected risks. In
your assessment as to the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, you
must consider the defendant's actual state of mind. You must hold the de-
fendant accountable as a reasonable person unless the defendant has offered
satisfactory evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption.
It should be noted that this type of mandatory presumption is uncon-
stitutional if reasonableness is an element of the offense or integrated in an
element of the offense because it relieves the state of its burden of proving
the elements of the offense. 0'
101. See, eg., Patterson, 432 U.S. 197; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510; Francis, 471 U.S. 307.
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